Understanding the Real Estate Title Doctrine of Practical Location

The doctrine of practical location allows courts to establish or recognize a boundary based on the conduct and mutual understanding of neighboring property owners. It is particularly relevant where:

1. Physical markers, such as fences, walls, or hedges, have served as the de facto boundary.
2. Mutual agreement between neighbors—express or implied—exists regarding the boundary’s location.
3. Acquiescence over time has occurred, with neither party objecting to the physical marker as the boundary.

For the doctrine to apply, the boundary must have been established and maintained for a significant period, typically equivalent to the statutory period for adverse possession (10 years in New York under RPAPL § 501). The doctrine prioritizes stability and equity over strict adherence to the technical descriptions in deeds or surveys. Notably, the doctrine will apply even where the elements of the claim can be established as between predecessors in interest rather than the current owners.

The Recent Case of Czenszak v. Iasello

The doctrine was recently revisited in a dispute between adjoining Long Island property owners separated by a cinder block wall. The case, Czenszak v. Iasello, resulted in preferencing the land beneath the wall as the de facto boundary line over the line indicated on a more recent survey, which may come as a surprise to some real estate professionals.[1]

The wall had stood for at least 60 years. The plaintiffs, Czenszak, argued that the wall represented the true boundary based on their longstanding use and reliance on it. However, a recent survey commissioned by the defendants, Iasello, indicated that the legal boundary described in the deeds did not align with the wall’s location. The defendants sought to enforce the deeded boundary, effectively claiming a portion of the plaintiffs’ property.

The plaintiffs invoked the doctrine of practical location, contending that:

1. The wall had been treated as the boundary by both parties for decades.
2. Both parties had maintained and made improvements up to the wall, reflecting their reliance on it as the dividing line.
3. The longstanding presence and mutual acceptance of the wall established it as the practical boundary.

The New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that the cinder block wall constituted the boundary under the doctrine of practical location. The court emphasized three key factors:

1. Longstanding Recognition: The wall had served as the boundary for over 60 years, without any objections from the parties or their predecessors.
2. Acquiescence: The defendants’ failure to contest the boundary during that period demonstrated acquiescence to the wall as the dividing line.
3. Equitable Considerations: Enforcing the deeded boundary would have disrupted the established expectations and use of the properties, leading to an inequitable result.

The court’s decision reinforces the tenet that mutual reliance and historical use can outweigh strict adherence to deed descriptions, particularly where the physical boundary has been relied upon for an extended period.

The Czenszak case follows a long-standing principle that applies the doctrine where there is “a clear demarcation of a boundary line and proof that there is mutual acquiescence to the boundary by the parties such that it is ‘definitely and equally known, understood and settled.’”[2]

Case history reveals a reasonably consistent application of the doctrine of practical location in New York. Of course, much will turn on the quality of the proof, which, given the inherent doctrinal requirements of the passage of time and occasionally the dependence on individual testimony, may undermine a claim.

Courts have focused on three recurring themes:

1. Longstanding Physical Markers: Whether a fence, a wall, or another structure, courts give significant weight to physical boundaries that have been treated as property lines over time.[3]
2. Mutual Acceptance and Acquiescence: The absence of objections by neighboring property owners is critical. In Czenszak and earlier cases, the courts inferred mutual acceptance from the lack of evidence of prior disputes.
3. Equity Over Technicality: Courts consistently prioritize equitable outcomes, refusing to disrupt long-established boundaries simply because of discrepancies when compared to deed descriptions.[4]

These principles ensure that the doctrine remains a practical tool for resolving disputes while protecting the reasonable expectations of property owners.

Practical Implications for Title Lawyers

For attorneys handling boundary disputes, Czenszak v. Iasello and its antecedents offer valuable guidance:

1. Early Assessment of Evidence

Lawyers should investigate whether physical markers, such as fences or walls, exist and whether they have been treated as boundaries. Photographs, maintenance records, and testimony from predecessors in interest can be critical in establishing acquiescence.

2. Focus on Longstanding Conduct

Evidence of the parties’ conduct, such as landscaping, construction, or other uses of the disputed area, is central to proving mutual acceptance.

3. Emphasize Equitable Factors

Courts are more likely to apply the doctrine when enforcing the deeded boundary would result in significant disruption or inequity. Demonstrating reliance on the practical boundary can strengthen a client’s case.

4. Leverage Precedent

Cases like Czenszak provide robust precedent for invoking the doctrine of practical location. Lawyers should frame their arguments within the context of these decisions to establish consistency with prior rulings.

Conclusion

The doctrine of practical location remains a vital component of New York property law, balancing technical accuracy with practical fairness. The decision in Czenszak v. Iasello illustrates how courts continue to rely on this doctrine to resolve boundary disputes equitably, honoring the expectations of property owners who have relied on physical markers for decades.

Please note that this is a general overview of developments in the law and does not constitute legal advice. Nothing herein creates an attorney-client relationship between the sender and recipient. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact David C. Wilkes at (212)-701-4175 or via email at DWilkes@cullenllp.com or Kevin M. Clyne at (516)-296-9118 or via email at KClyne@cullenllp.com.

Thank you to Associate, Daniel Parise, for his assistance in this legal alert. 

Footnotes

[1] 227 A.D.3d 772 (2d Dep’t 2024).

[2] See McMahon v. Thornton, 69 A.D.3d 1157, 1160 (3d Dep’t 2010) (quoting Robert v. Shaul, 62 A.D.3d 1127, 1128 (3d Dep’t 2009)).

[3] See Jakubowicz v. Solomon, 107 A.D.3d 852 (2d Dep’t 2013) (noting “the defendant submitted evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties’ predecessors-in-interest mutually acquiesced to the hedgerow and chain-link fence as the boundary line” and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment).

[4] See generally Czenszak, 227 A.D.3d 772; McMahon, 69 A.D.3d 1157; Jakubowicz, 107 A.D.3d 852.